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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are: 
1. Chris Ann Williams ("Mellor"), as guardian of Hay den Williams (deceased 
minor); and 
2. Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance and Wasatch Crest Insurance Company 
(collectively "Wasatch Crest." 
3. While not named as parties in this matter, Utah Life & Health Insurance Guaranty 
Association ("ULHIGA") and the Liquidator for Wasatch Crest ("Liquidator") are 
integrally involved in the matter. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann §78A-3-102(3)G) and Utah R. 
App. P. 4(a). Judge Toomey entered a Memorandum Decision and Order denying 
Plaintiff Chris Ann Mellor's ("Mellor") Motion for Summary Judgment and granting the 
Defendants' Motion to Stay on November 1, 2010. Mellor filed her Notice of Appeal on 
December 1, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE: The Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act ("the Act"), U.C.A. §31A-
27-301 et seq., provides class three distribution priority for losses incurred by insureds 
and federal and state governments. Mellor and the Utah Office of Recovery Services 
("ORS") asserted claims for medical expenses against Wasatch Crest in liquidation but 
the Liquidator ruled that those claims had class six distribution priority because they were 
not classified elsewhere in the statute. Does the class three language include the claims 
ofMellorandORS? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
The following is central to Mellor's appeal: 
• U.C.A.§31A-27-301ef^. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case brought for recovery of wrongfully denied health insurance benefits 
which should have been provided for Hayden under a group health benefits plan 
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sponsored by his father's employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq. The insurer for that employer-
sponsored plan, Wasatch Crest, terminated Hay den's coverage after he became eligible 
for coverage from Utah State Medicaid following his catastrophic drowning accident in 
2001 and denied coverage for Hayden's medical expenses. Wasatch Crest subsequently 
was declared insolvent and ongoing administration was appointed to the Liquidator. 
Hayden's benefit claim made its way through the district court and the first 
Supreme Court decision ("Initial Decision") held that Wasatch Crest was required to 
provide COBRA continuation coverage for up to 36 months after Hayden's initial 
qualifying event and that his eligibility for Medicaid did not relieve Wasatch Crest of the 
obligation to provide that coverage . The Initial Decision further held that Mellor, as 
Hayden's guardian, had standing to pursue the claim against Wasatch Crest for its 
wrongful denial of coverage for Hayden's medical expenses. Following the Initial 
Decision and after a year of inaction by the Liquidator, Mellor requested the district 
court's ruling on the priority of the claim. Mellor asserted that the claim had a class three 
distribution priority because it was a claim for health benefits by an insured for which 
Wasatch Crest had wrongfully denied payment. 
The district court erred in accepting the Liquidator's argument that Mellor's claim 
was not properly included as a class three distribution priority claim but fell under lower 
priority class six claims. Mellor seeks this Court's order that the claim, based on her own 
standing and her existing Collection Agreement with ORS, is properly included in class 
three distribution priority rather than class six. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The essential facts in the case are undisputed and the trial court's Order consisted 
of conclusions of law based on those undisputed facts. Those facts are: 
1. Justin Williams ("Williams") was employed by Mellor Engineering and was a 
participant in the group health benefits plan ("the Plan") provided by Mellor 
Engineering for its employees. Record, vol. 12, p. 5049. 
2. Williams also elected coverage under the Plan for his wife and children. Id. 
3. Williams' employment with Mellor Engineering terminated as of August, 
2000. Id. 
4. Williams elected COBRA continuation coverage for himself and his family 
after his employment ended. Id. 
5. Williams and Mellor were divorced in March of 2001. Id. 
6. Hayden's COBRA continuation coverage continued under the Plan following 
the divorce of his parents. Id. 
7. Hayden's coverage under the Plan was in place on the date of his drowning 
accident, August 4, 2001. Id. 
8. Hayden's health care providers submitted claims for payment of his medical 
expenses after the accident and the Plan paid claims on behalf of Hay den. Id. 
9. Following the accident, Mellor applied for Medicaid coverage for Hay den and 
the application was granted retroactive to August 1, 2001. Id. 
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10. Mellor applied for Medicaid coverage for Hay den because she anticipated the 
possibility that the Plan would not provide coverage for all of Hay den's 
expenses. Record, vol. 12, p. 5189. 
11. In addition, Mellor knew that Hay den's COBRA benefit would not continue 
indefinitely and that when it ended, she would need Medicaid assistance to pay 
Hay den's medical expenses. Id. 
12. The Plan terminated Hay den's coverage as of August 1, 2001, and requested 
reimbursement of amounts already paid to Hay den's health care providers. 
Record, vol. 12, 5049. 
13. In August, September and October of 2001, premiums continued to be paid for 
COBRA continuation coverage for Hayden through the Plan. Record, vol. 9, 
p. 3577. 
14. Some time beginning in November of 2001, the Plan, through its 
reimbursement specialist, AGA, invoked an exclusion in the Wasatch Crest 
policy, asserting that Wasatch Crest had no obligation to pay for any of 
Hayden's medical expenses associated with the accident because there was no 
coverage under the policy for Hayden at any time after August 1, 2001, the 
date he became eligible for coverage from Medicaid. Record, vol. 9, p. 3741. 
15. Wasatch Crest through AGA, collected reimbursement from healthcare 
providers that it had previously paid for services provided to Hayden including 
$5,987.47 from South Davis Community Hospital and $23,809 from Primary 
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Children's Hospital, and denied any obligation to cover any medical expenses 
that remained unpaid by the Plan. Record vol. 9, pp. 3741, 3900-04, and 3920. 
16. The expenses incurred by Hay den for his medical care from the accident were 
extensive. The total amount paid by Medicaid paid for Hay den's medical care 
through October 31, 2003 was $184,670.06. Record, vol. 11, p. 4607. 
17. Mellor stopped paying Hayden's COBRA premium in November, 2001, based 
on the Defendants' assertion that he was no longer eligible for coverage. 
Record, vol. 12, p. 5190. 
18. If Mellor had known that Hay den was, in fact, eligible to continue with 
COBRA benefits until July 31, 2003, she would have continued to pay his 
COBRA premiums. Id. 
19. Throughout the time frame at issue - from August 1, 2001 through July 31, 
2003, Hayden's medical expenses were submitted to, and paid by, Medicaid. 
Record, vol. 12, p. 5192. 
20. The total amount of claims paid by Medicaid during the time frame when 
Hay den should have had COBRA continuation coverage, from August 1, 2001 
through July 31, 2003, is $181,357.51. Id. 
21. In 2002, ORS entered into a Collection Agreement with Mellor which 
authorized inclusion of ORS's claims for reimbursement with Mellor's claims 
against Wasatch Crest. Record, vol. 12, 5049. 
22. AGa communicated with ORS, the Utah state agency charged with recovering 
reimbursement of Medicaid funds, in August and September of 2002, about 
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whether Wasatch Crest was responsible to pay Hayden's medical expenses. 
Record, vol. 9, p. 3928. 
23. In response to ORS's claim, AGA asserted that the claims had been properly 
denied and that Wasatch Crest was not obligated to reimburse Medicaid. Id. 
24. On September 25, 2002, ORS entered into a collection agreement with 
Mellor's prior counsel, Robert Schumacher, in which ORS authorized Mellor 
and her counsel to represent the interests of Medicaid, as well as Mellor's and 
Hayden's, in pursuing payment of the denied medical expenses arising out of 
Hayden's accident from Wasatch Crest. Record, vol. 11, pp. 4641-4647. 
25. On March 10, 2003, Mellor filed suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court for 
Utah County against Wasatch Crest for its " . . . unlawful denial of coverage on 
medical and health care expenses . . . " arising out of Hayden's accident. 
Record, vol. 10, p. 3959. 
26. On July 11,2003, Wasatch Crest was declared insolvent and proceedings were 
initiated in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County for its 
liquidation. Record, vol. 10, p. 3959. 
27. On November 5, 2003, Mellor filed a claim in the Wasatch Crest liquidation 
proceeding on behalf of Hay den for payment of his medical expenses. Mellor 
included information in that Notice to indicate that ORS had a lien on the 
claim. Record, vol. 13, p. 5583. 
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28. In December of 2003, Mellor's attorney wrote to the Liquidator and attached 
an updated ORS lien to supplement Mellor's November 5, 2003 Notice of 
Claim. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5602-5603. 
29. On September 6, 2006, counsel for ORS, Stephanie Saperstein, submitted a 
Notice of Representation of Medicaid Claim to the district court to further 
establish the agreement between ORS and Mellor. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5628-
5634. 
30. On August 6, 2007, the district court entered an Order Approving Referee's 
Findings of Fact and Recommendation Regarding Claim No. 300087 - Chris 
Ann Williams (Mellor); and Denying Motions of Liquidator and ULHIGA 
Regarding Claimant's Standing. Record, vol. 12, pp. 4939 - 4942. 
31. All parties appealed and after briefing their various arguments and presenting 
oral argument before the Supreme Court of Utah, the Supreme Court entered 
its Initial Decision on January 8, 2009. Record, vol. 12, pp. 5048 - 5056. 
32. The Initial Decision held that Hay den was an insured under the Wasatch Crest 
insurance policy at the time of his accident and during the time frame at issue 
in the case and that Mellor had standing to pursue the claim. Record, vol. 12, 
pp. 5055. 
33. The matter was remitted to the district court on February 20, 2009. Record, 
vol. 12, pp. 5075-5076. 
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34. After Mellor's attempts to resolve the claim with the Liquidator were 
unsuccessful, she filed her Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum 
in Support on January 21, 2010. Record, vol. 12, pp. 5141 - 5187. 
35. Concurrently with her Motion and Memorandum, Mellor prepared and 
submitted her own Affidavit and the Affidavit of Carrie Worthen. Record, vol. 
12, pp. 5188 - 5190 and pp. 5191 - 5325 respectively. 
36. Early in 2010, Wasatch Crest and the Liquidator began distribution and 
payment of various class two and class three claims. Mellor received no 
notification of any payments by Wasatch Crest or the Liquidator. See, e g., 
Record, vol. 12, pp. 5326 - 5327. 
37. The Liquidator periodically submitted reports on the status of the liquidation to 
the district court. A Report on Status of Liquidation Estate for Period Ending 
December 31, 2009 was submitted on February 16, 2010. Record, vol. 12, pp. 
5333-5337. 
38. The Liquidator referred in his report to the Initial Decision and Mellor's 
recently filed Motion for Summary Judgment. The report stated that the Initial 
Decision had " . . . found in favor of the claimant on a narrow issue not 
necessarily dispositive of the case." Record, vol. 12, p. 5335. 
39. Wasatch Crest filed its Memorandum in Support of (1) Liquidator's Motion to 
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, (2) Motion to Stay Claimant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, (3) Memorandum in Opposition to 
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Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment on April 27, 2010. Record, vol. 13, 
pp. 5564-5603. 
40. Wasatch Crest continued to argue that Mellor lacked standing and the real 
party in interest was Medicaid. Record, vol. 13, p. 5567. 
41. Wasatch Crest also argued that because Medicaid had provided payment for 
Hay den's medical expenses, Mellor's claim, at best, was a class six claim 
rather than a claim for coverage of an insured under the policy which would be 
classified as a class three claim. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5577 - 5579. 
42. Mellor filed her Consolidated Response Memorandum in Support of her 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss on Jun 1, 2010. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5615 - 5634. 
43. Wasatch Crest filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of its various Motions 
on June 29, 2010. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5641 - 5653. 
44. Wasatch Crest argued that Utah statute prohibited equitable restoration of 
Mellor's claim from a class six to a class three claim. Record, vol. 13, pp. 
5647 - 5649. 
45. Wasatch Crest attached as Exhibit A to its Reply Memo a "Second Amended 
Notice of Determination to Claimant" ("2nd Notice") dated June 29, 2010. 
Record, vol. 13, p. 5653. 
46. The 2nQ Notice was prepared and provided as an exhibit to Wasatch Crest's 
Reply Memo and was never formally served on Mellor or her counsel at a 
notification of a decision by the Liquidator. Id. 
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47. Oral argument was held on August 31, 2010. Record, vol. 13, p. 5689. 
48. The Court issued its Memorandum and Order on November 1, 2010 ("11/1/10 
Order"), granting Wasatch Crest's Motion to Stay and denying Mellor's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Record, vol. 13, pp. 5702 - 5709. 
49. The 11/1/10 Order agreed with Wasatch Crest that Mellor's claim was a class 
six claim because Mellor's claim fell outside the scope of class three status. 
Record, vol. 13, p. 5708. 
50. Mellor filed her Notice of Appeal on December 1, 2010, Record, vol. 13, pp. 
5714-5715. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Initial Decision is clear and unambiguous in holding that Hay den was a 
beneficiary of the Wasatch Crest insurance policy and that Mellor has standing both for 
herself and ORS, to pursue reimbursement of Hay den's claim from Wasatch Crest. The 
district court's 11/1/10 Order errs because Mellor's claim is for losses incurred under 
Hay den's health insurance policy with Wasatch Crest. Whether those claims are asserted 
by Mellor on her own behalf or on behalf of ORS, they should be treated as class three 
rather than class six priority claims. 
ARGUMENT 
Mellor's Claims Fall Within Class Three Distribution Priority Under the Act 
The Liquidator claims that because Medicaid relieved Mellor of the financial 
responsibilities associated with Hay den's medical treatment, Mellor's claims for payment 
under the policy are transmogrified from class three to class six claims. The Liquidator is 
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wrong. Class three claims are: 
(i) . . . all claims under policies for losses incurred including: 
(A) Claims of the federal, state, or local government; 
(B)Third party claims;... 
(ii) All claims under life and health insurance and annuity policies shall be 
treated as loss claims. 
(iii) That portion of any loss for which indemnification is provided by other 
benefits or advantages recovered or recoverable by the claimant are not 
included in this class, other than benefits or advantages recovered or 
recoverable in discharge of familial obligations of support, by way of 
succession at death, as proceeds of life insurance, or as gratuities . . . 
(emphasis added) 
U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c). Class six claims are: 
(A) Any person, including claims of state or local governments, except 
those specifically classified elsewhere in this section;... (emphasis 
added) 
U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(f). 
The claims presented by Mellor in her Proof of Claim dated November 5, 2003, 
and in her "Supplemental Exhibit" to her proof of claim dated December 8, 2003, make 
clear that both she and ORS asserted claims against Wasatch Crest for losses incurred. 
Under the terms of U.C.A. §31A-27-335(c)(l)(A), those claims included losses incurred 
and claims paid by the federal and state government. ORS' Notice of Representation of 
Medicaid Claim, filed on September 7, 2006, also gave clear and unequivocal notice to 
the Liquidator of Medicaid's interest in the Mellor claim and its right to be reimbursed 
under both the Utah State Medical Benefits Recovery Act, U.C.A. §26-19 et. seq., and 
under U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c). The claim by Mellor, and the interest of ORS in that 
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claim, were known by the Liquidator for years before the final adjudication of class three 
claims began in January of 2010. In light of these facts, it is not credible for the 
Liquidator to argue that he had no timely notice of both Mellor's and Medicaid's claims.1 
The Liquidator argued, and the district court ruled, that class three claims do not 
include "that portion of any loss for which indemnification is provided by other benefits 
or advantages recovered or recoverable by the claimant" under U.C.A. §31A-27-
335(2)(c)(iii). Record, vol. 13, p. 5707 (11/1/10 Order, p. 6). However, this general 
language is insufficient to override the explicit reference in U.C.A. §31A-27-
335(2)(c)(i)(A) to claims of the federal and state government for losses incurred being 
class three claims. If indemnification had already been provided to ORS from some other 
source for the amounts it paid out on Hay den's claim, perhaps the Liquidator's argument 
would be more persuasive. But Utah's Medicaid program is simply out-of-pocket the 
money it has paid for Hayden's medical bills. U.C.A. §26-19-5 makes clear that the lien 
ORS has for repayment of Hayden's expenses " . . . has priority over all other claims to 
the proceeds . . . " except claims for attorney fees and costs as authorized under U.C.A. 
§26-19-7(2)(c)(ii). 
The Liquidator also asserts, and the 11/1/10 Order agreed, that Mellor's and 
ORS's claim " . . . may not be permitted to circumvent the priority classes through the use 
of equitable remedies," U.C.A. §31A-27-335(l)(d), and that "obligations to insurers . . . 
and their claims for contribution, indemnity, or subrogation, equitable or otherwise . . . , " 
1
 It is particularly difficult to accept the Liquidator's argument that he had no notice of Medicaid's interest in 
Mellor's claim in light of the fact that the very reason Wasatch Crest cut off Hayden's coverage in 2001 was 
because Medicaid had begun to cover Hayden's expense arising out of his accident. 
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U.C.A. §31A-27-335(2)(c)(iv)(C), are excluded from class three claims. Record, vol 13, 
pp. 5707-5708 (11/1/10 Order, pp. 6-7). But Mellor's claims against the Liquidator are 
claims on the Wasatch Crest insurance policy, a written contract, rather than equitable 
claims. Indeed, in 2001 Wasatch Crest initially paid, and then clawed back, medical 
expenses for Hay den in substantial amounts. Record, vol. 9, pp. 3741, 3900-04, and 
3920. 
In addition, the claims are not equitable in light of the terms of U.C.A. §26-19-
7(2)(c)(ii) and the language of the United States Code mandating that, as a condition of 
receipt of federal dollars, the Utah state Medicaid program must maintain a program to 
pursue reimbursement of funds paid out by Medicaid but for which third parties are later 
determined to be responsible. Medicaid was designed to be the "payer of last resort" for 
individuals who have no other resources for payment of medical bills. Rehabilitation 
Association of Virginia, Inc. v. Kozlowskt 42 F.3d 1444, 1447 (4th Cir. 1994). To, 
among other things, ensure that Medicaid does not become a target of cost shifting by 
for-profit insurers, state agencies charged with implementing the program are required to 
"take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties . . . to pay for 
care and services available under the plan." 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(25)(A). Federal statute 
also requires that the Utah State Medicaid program put in place a mechanism to actively 
pursue and collect from these third party payment sources: "in any case where such a 
legal liability is found to exist after medical assistance . . . [has been provided], the State 
or local agency will seek reimbursement for such assistance to the extent of such legal 
liability" (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(25)(B). In the face of such clear 
16 
statutory directives, Mellor's and ORS's claims are not equitable. 
It is true that the legal effect of Hayden's qualification for Medicaid coverage was 
to eliminate any ability of his health care providers to bill Hay den or his mother, Mellor, 
for any expenses associated with Hayden's medical treatment above and beyond the 
amount paid under the Medicaid payment schedules in place at the time. However, in 
light of the Initial Decision in this case, Medicaid should never have stepped in and paid 
Hayden's medical expenses at all. The Initial Decision establishes that Wasatch Crest, 
rather than Medicaid, should have paid Hayden's medical expenses. Had Wasatch Crest 
acted as they should have in 2001, Mellor and Hayden would not have been shielded 
from receiving bills for the full cost of Hayden's medical treatment. Wasatch Crest 
would have received those bills and would have paid them as required under the 
insurance policy regardless of any involvement by Medicaid. 
Adopting Wasatch Crest's argument goes beyond simply ignoring the Initial 
Decision. It allows Wasatch Crest to receive a windfall due to its own bad act in refusing 
to pay a valid claim. Giving Wasatch Crest a monetary advantage arising out of the 
financial stress Wasatch Crest itself caused by refusing to pay Hayden's medical claims 
circumvents the express language of the statutes governing the relationship between 
federal and state taxpayers funding Medicaid and private insurers such as Wasatch Crest. 
Wasatch Crest, through its own improper refusal to pay Hayden's claims, caused 
Medicaid to step up to the plate and pay Hayden's medical expenses. Shifting the costs 
of valid claims from Wasatch Crest to taxpayers is expressly prohibited by federal statute. 
Record, vol. 12, pp. 5053-5054 (Initial Decision, ^|17). 
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Simply put, but for its improper denial of Hay den's claims in November, 2001, 
Wasatch Crest would have paid Hay den's claims in the ordinary course of its claims 
processing activities in a manner no differently than the processing and payment of any 
other claims. Its actions in violation of the terms of the policy, federal, and state statute 
created the facts that it now asserts justify Mellor's claims being treated as class six 
rather than class three claims. 
There are additional reasons to deny Wasatch Crest's attempt to bootstrap its way 
into treating Mellor's claims as class six rather than class three claims. Wasatch Crest is 
wrong when it asserts that "the real party in interest is the actual payor [Medicaid], not 
Mellor." Record, vol. 13, p. 5577 (Wasatch Crest Memorandum, p. 14). In fact, the 
Collection Agreement attached as part of Exhibit A to that Memorandum, and included as 
part of the Notice of Representation of Medicaid Claim filed on September 7, 2006, 
makes clear that ORS, Mellor and her counsel agree to include ORS's claim as a part of 
the claim Mellor is pursuing. The claim Mellor asserts is larger than the amount 
Medicaid has paid. In all likelihood, the amount Wasatch Crest is obligated to pay under 
the terms of its insurance policy will be significantly greater than the amount the 
providers were paid under the relatively low Medicaid fee schedules. While Wasatch 
Crest asserts that Mellor has been relieved of any obligation to the healthcare providers, 
this was true only so long as Medicaid was properly the payer of Hay den's bills. But in 
light of the Initial Decision, it's evident that Medicaid never should have paid Hay den's 
bills and his providers should never have been precluded from submitting their full billed 
charges to Wasatch Crest for processing and payment. 
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Wasatch Crest asserts that Mellor has been paid for her policy losses by receiving 
Medicaid benefits. But this is simply not accurate. Mellor received welfare benefits 
from taxpayers in light of her own lack of resources and the immensity of the past and 
prospective medical expenses from Hayden's catastrophic accident. The only reason the 
taxpayers stepped up to the plate was because Wasatch Crest wrongly dodged its own 
obligation to do so. The amount Mellor seeks in this lawsuit is not simply the amount 
Medicaid paid for Hay den's expenses. It is an amount above and beyond that figure and 
represents what Wasatch Crest should have paid for Hay den's medical expenses but, thus 
far, has not. 
Finally, even if Mellor was acting purely as agent for recovery of Medicaid funds, 
the claims at issue in this case properly fall under class three priority distribution for 
another independent reason: they are claims for losses under the Wasatch Crest policy to 
reimburse the Utah State Medicaid program. That Utah state government program, 
funded through federal and state taxpayer dollars, is asserting through Mellor a claim for 
a loss under the Wasatch Crest policy. The Medical Benefits Recovery Act authorizes 
payment of benefits directly to ORS that would otherwise be payable to Mellor. U.C.A. 
§26-19-4.5. As such, these claims fall under the express language of U.C.A. §31A-21-
335(2)(c)(i)(A). 
CONCLUSION 
Mellor and ORS have presented claims to the Liquidator for losses incurred by 
them relating to Hayden's medical expenses. Those claims fall squarely within the 
language of class three distribution priority in U.C.A. §31A-21-335(2)(c). The district 
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court erred in ruling that Mellor's claims were class six rather than class three claims. 
The district court ruling should be reversed and the case should be remanded with 
instructions to the district court to calculate the amount that should have been paid by 
Wasatch Crest under the policy on Mellor's claims. 
DATED this _[± day of May, 2011. 
Brian S. King ' 
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff 
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OPINION BY: WILKINS 
OPINION 
[**1006] WILKINS, Justice: 
[*P1] Appellant Chris Ann Williams Mellor ap-
peals from an adverse order of the district court which 
held that her minor son, Hayden Williams, was not cov-
ered by a Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company 
health plan when he suffered a near drowning accident 
on August 3, 2001. Appellees Wasatch Crest and Utah 
Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association 
cross-appeal the district court's holding that Ms. Mellor 
has standing in this case to bring an action on behalf of 
her minor son. We affirm the district court's holding as to 
standing but reverse on the issue of coverage. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] Hayden Williams' father, Justin Williams, 
was employed by Mellor Engineering. During his em-
ployment, Mr. Williams participated [***2] in Mellor 
Engineering's employee welfare benefits plan, which was 
provided through Wasatch Crest Insurance Company 
(Wasatch Crest). Both Ms. Mellor and Hayden were be-
neficiaries under the Wasatch Crest plan. When Mr. Wil-
liams' employment with Mellor Engineering terminated 
in August 2000, he elected to continue health coverage 
for himself and his family through the Wasatch Crest 
plan under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1985 (COBRA). Mr. Williams and Ms. 
Mellor divorced in March 2001. COBRA premiums con-
tinued to be paid for Hayden, and Wasatch Crest contin-
ued to accept them, through November 7,2001. 
[*P3] On August 3, 2001, Hayden suffered a near 
drowning accident which resulted in catastrophic, per-
manent injuries. Because of the overwhelming medical 
expenses and the prospect of ongoing expenses for Hay-
den's future care, Ms. Mellor applied for Medicaid cov-
erage for Hayden two weeks after the accident. The ap-
plication was approved in September 2001. Under Me-
dicaid guidelines, and because of the need to ensure cov-
erage for Hayden's past and future medical expenses, 
Hayden's effective coverage date was backdated to Au-
gust 1,2001. 
[*P4] The Wasatch Crest plan continued to make 
[***3] payments for Hayden's medical care until No-
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vember 2001. At that time, Wasatch Crest asserted that 
under language of the plan, it had no obligation to con-
tinue coverage for Hayden after Medicaid coverage be-
gan on August 1, 2001. Wasatch Crest requested reim-
bursement from Hayden's health care providers and col-
lected from many of them. In August of 2002, the Utah 
State Office of Recovery Services (ORS) began an effort 
to collect money from Wasatch Crest which it alleged 
had been improperly paid by Medicaid and should have 
been paid by the Wasatch Crest plan. A month later, 
ORS entered into a Collection Agreement with Ms. 
Mellor which authorized Ms. Mellor to include ORS's 
claim for reimbursement with her civil claims against 
Wasatch Crest, with ORS as an assignee of her rights of 
recovery. 
[**1007] [*P5] On July 11, 2003, Wasatch 
Crest was declared insolvent. The district court set July 
31, 2004 as the deadline for filing a proof of claim 
against the Wasatch Crest estate in liquidation. Ms. Mel-
lor filed a timely claim. The claims in liquidation are 
being administered by Utah Life and Health Insurance 
Guaranty Association (ULHIGA), which thus became a 
party to this action. 
[*P6] A referee appointed to adjudicate [***4] 
disputes between claimants and Wasatch Crest's liquida-
tor ruled that, under the language of the Wasatch Crest 
Plan, Wasatch Crest had no obligation to pay any of 
Hayden's medical expenses as of August 1, 2001. Ms. 
Mellor filed an objection with the Third District Court. 
At the subsequent hearing, Wasatch Crest and ULHIGA 
alleged that Ms. Mellor did not have standing to file a 
claim in the liquidation proceeding. The court agreed that 
Ms. Mellor did not have standing in her own right, but 
ruled that Ms. Mellor did have standing to file a claim on 
behalf of Hayden. The court further determined that 
while some of the documents that had been generated in 
connection with the claim had not always clearly desig-
nated that Ms. Mellor was acting in Hayden's behalf, it 
had been understood since the time that Ms. Mellor first 
initiated civil action that she was acting for Hayden. 
Nevertheless, the court approved the referee's findings as 
to Wasatch Crest's liability, ruling that Hayden had not 
been covered by the Wasatch Crest plan at the time of his 
accident. Ms. Mellor appealed the ruling on coverage to 
this court, and Wasatch Crest and ULHIGA 
cross-appealed on the issue of standing. 
STANDARD [***5] OF REVIEW 
[*P7] An insurance policy is a contract between 
the insured and the insurer. Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 
2006 UT 20 P 14, 133 P. 3d 428. Questions of contract 
interpretation which are confined to the language of the 
contract itself are questions of law, which we review for 
correctness. Fairbourn Commer., Inc. v. Am. Hous. 
Ptnrs., Inc., 2004 UT 54, P6, 94 P.3d 292. Likewise, a 
determination of standing is generally a question of law, 
which we review for correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp. 
v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997); see also 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
I. MS. MELLOR HAS STANDING ON BEHALF OF 
HER MINOR SON HAYDEN 
[*P8] As an employer sponsored welfare benefits 
plan, the Wasatch Crest insurance plan at issue is go-
verned by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA). See 29 US.C. § 1003(a) (2008). ERISA con-
tains a specific provision governing standing. It provides, 
"A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant or 
beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under the 
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights to future benefits 
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights under 
the terms of the plan." 29 US.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2008). 
[*P9] [***6] Thus, the issues in this case are in-
terdependent; if Hayden is "a participant or beneficiary" 
under the Wasatch Crest plan, he has standing to bring an 
action in this case. Id. As we discuss in detail below, we 
hold that Hayden was a participant or beneficiary under 
the Wasatch Crest plan, a status which entitles him to 
pursue recovery of any benefits which may be owing to 
him under the plan through the courts. Given Hayden's 
status as a minor child, it follows that his mother, Ms. 
Mellor, has standing to bring an action on his behalf. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a)-(b). 
[*P10] Appellees have made much of the fact that 
Ms. Mellor has assigned all rights of recovery in this 
case to ORS through a Collection Agreement. They ar-
gue that because of this assignment Hayden is not the 
real party in interest in this case and that he therefore 
does not have standing to pursue a cause of action. On 
the contrary, the assignment has no effect on the standing 
of Hayden, or through Hayden, Ms. Mellor. The Collec-
tion Agreement does nothing more than place a lien in 
favor of ORS on any reimbursement for medical ex-
penses that may be recovered from Wasatch Crest. Thus, 
beyond its function of routing any potential [**1008] 
[***7] recovery, the Collection Agreement has no re-
levance to the case before us. 
II. HAYDEN HAD COVERAGE UNDER THE WA-
SATCH CREST PLAN ON THE DATE OF HIS AC-
CIDENT 
[*P11] The COBRA modifications to ERISA re-
quire that "an employer who sponsors a group health 
plan . . . give the plan's 'qualified beneficiaries' the op-
portunity to elect 'continuation coverage' under the plan 
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when the beneficiaries might otherwise lose coverage 
upon the occurrence of certain 'qualifying events,' in-
cluding . . . the termination of the covered employee's 
employment . . . ." Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 524 
U.S. 74, 79-80, 118 S. Ct. 1869, 141 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1998) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1163). When Mr. Williams' em-
ployment with Mellor Engineering terminated, Mr. Wil-
liams elected continuation coverage for himself and his 
dependents, including Hayden, pursuant to this statute. 
No responsible party subsequently took any affirmative 
action to remove Hayden from the Wasatch Crest plan. 
Appellants nonetheless argue that, under the language of 
the plan, Hayden's coverage terminated on August 1, 
2001 when Hayden became covered by Medicaid. We 
therefore must determine whether coverage was termi-
nated by operation of law. 
A. Exclusion 4 and Exclusion 17 Create an Inconsistency 
[***8] in the Wasatch Crest Plan and Are Therefore 
Ambiguous 
[*P12] At issue is the interplay between two ex-
clusions to coverage in the Wasatch Crest plan as out-
lined in "Part 7 - Exclusions" of the plan: 
4. Expenses covered by programs 
created by the laws of the United States, 
any state, or any political subdivision of a 
state. 
17. Services, supplies, or treatment 
for which Benefits are provided under 
Medicare or any other government pro-
gram, except Medicaid. 
We have previously held that an insurance contract must 
communicate its terms with sufficient clarity that it can 
be understood by a reasonable purchaser of insurance. 
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, P 8, 99 P.3d 
796. The test for clarity in an insurance contract is as 
follows: 
[W]ould the meaning be plain to a 
person of ordinary intelligence and under-
standing, viewing the matter fairly and 
reasonably, in accordance with the usual 
and natural meaning of the words, and in 
the light of existing circumstances, in-
cluding the purpose of the policy [?] 
Auto Lease Co. v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Utah 2d 336, 
325 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1958). "Whether an ambiguity 
exists in [an insurance] contract is a question of law." 
Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 2006 UT 20, P 14, 133 P.3d 
428 [***9] (internal quotation marks omitted). We 
therefore review for correctness. Id. 
[*P13] We have observed that "ambiguities typi-
cally appear in two forms: 'An ambiguity in a contract 
may arise (1) because of vague or ambiguous language in 
a particular provision or (2) because two or more con-
tract provisions, when read together, give rise to different 
or inconsistent meanings, even though each provision is 
clear when read alone.'" Farmers Ins. Exch, 2004 UT 73, 
P 9, 99 P.3d 796 (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. 
Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993)). 
[*P14] The ambiguity in the present case is of the 
second variety. Medicaid is clearly a "program created 
by the laws of the United States, any state, or any politi-
cal subdivision of a state." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396-1396w-l (2008). Therefore, exclusion 4 indicates 
that expenses covered by Medicaid, as are the disputed 
expenses in this case, are not covered by the Wasatch 
Crest plan. However, exclusion 17 indicates exactly the 
opposite-that while "services, supplies, or treatment" 
covered by "Medicare or any other government program" 
will not also be covered by the Wasatch Crest plan, "ser-
vices, supplies, or treatment" covered specifically by 
Medicaid are not excluded [*** 10] from plan coverage. 
[*P15] Appellees attempt to read these two provi-
sions consistently by arguing that "services, supplies, or 
treatment" in exclusion 17 represent a small, covered 
exception carved out of the larger category of excluded 
"expenses" in exclusion 4. However, Appellees are una-
ble to provide us with a single example of an "expense" 
that could not also be categorized as a "service, supply, 
or treatment." [**1009] Such a distinction is surely 
equally beyond the understanding of a reasonable pur-
chaser of insurance. We therefore hold that the two pro-
visions when read together give rise to inconsistent 
meanings and that the language of the Wasatch Crest 
plan is consequently ambiguous. 
[*P16] Insurance contracts are generally drafted 
by the insurance companies and allow no opportunity for 
negotiation of the terms by the insured. Farmers Ins. 
Exch, 2004 UT 73, P 24, 99 P.3d 796. In light of this 
fact, and in order to assure that the purpose for which the 
policy was purchased and the premiums were paid is not 
defeated, we interpret insurance policies liberally in fa-
vor of the insured. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 854 P.2d at 
521. We have therefore held that when an ambiguity 
exists in an insurance contract, that ambiguity [***H] 
is interpreted in favor of coverage. Id. at 522-523. More 
specifically, "[I]f an insurance contract has inconsistent 
provisions, one which can be construed against coverage 
and one which can be construed in favor of coverage, the 
contract should be construed in favor of coverage." Id. at 
523 (internal citations omitted). Thus, we construe the 
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ambiguities in the Wasatch Crest policy in favor of cov-
erage and therefore reverse the decision of the district 
court. 
B. Federal and State Law Prohibit Wasatch Crest from 
Terminating Coverage Because Hayden Became Cov-
ered by Medicaid 
[*P17] Both federal and state law evidence a clear 
policy of prohibiting insurance companies from shifting 
their obligation for medical expenses to the taxpay-
er-funded Medicaid program. ERISA, as amended by 
COBRA, provides that COBRA coverage cannot be li-
mited by a plan beneficiary's eligibility for or participa-
tion in Medicaid: 
A group health plan shall provide that, 
in enrolling an individual as a participant 
or beneficiary or in determining or mak-
ing any payments for benefits of an indi-
vidual as a participant or beneficiary, the 
fact that the individual is eligible for or is 
provided medical assistance under a State 
plan [***12] for medical assistance ap-
proved under title XIX of the Social Se-
curity Act * . . . will not be taken into ac-
count. 
29 U.S.C. § 1169(b)(2) (2008). 
1 Title XIX of the Social Security Act creates 
the Medicaid program. 42 U.S.C § 
1396-1396w-l (2008). 
[*P18] ERISA generally preempts state law. See 
29 U.S.C § 1144(a) (2008). An exception exists for state 
laws created to aid in recovering state Medicaid funds 
from employee welfare benefit plans. Id. § 
1144(b)(8)(B). Therefore, Utah employee benefit plans 
must comply with Utah Code section 26-19-9 which 
prohibits employer sponsored heath insurance plans from 
excluding from coverage health care expenses that are 
also eligible for coverage under Medicaid: 
As allowed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1144, an employee benefit plan may 
not include any provision that has the ef-
fect of limiting or excluding coverage or 
payment for any health care for an indi-
vidual who would otherwise be covered 
or entitled to benefits or services under 
the terms of the employee benefit plan 
based on the fact that the individual is eli-
gible for or is provided services under the 
state plan. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-9 (2007). 
[*P19] Appellees argue that the Wasatch Crest 
plan complies with [***13] the Utah statute because it 
specifies in exclusion 17 that "services" covered by Me-
dicaid are not excluded. However, this argument fails 
because regardless of whether the Wasatch Crest plan 
nominally complies, if exclusion 4 precludes coverage 
for any expenses covered by a government program, it 
"has the effect of limiting or excluding coverage or pay-
ment for any health care for an individual who would 
otherwise be covered or entitled to benefits or services 
under the terms of the . . . plan." Id. 
[*P20] In order to interpret the Wasatch Crest 
plan in conformity with the relevant federal and state 
statutes, we read exclusions 4 and 17 to operate in such a 
manner that they do not preclude coverage for medical 
[**1010] expenses which are also covered by Medica-
id. Indeed, we find additional justification for this read-
ing in the Wasatch Crest plan itself, which states, "If any 
provision of this Policy is contrary to any law to which it 
is subject, such provision is hereby amended to conform 
thereto." Therefore, we hold lhat the terms of the Wa-
satch Crest plan did not operate to terminate Hayden's 
coverage as a matter of law when Hayden became eligi-
ble for Medicaid coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P21] At best, exclusion [***14] 4 and exclu-
sion 17 create an ambiguity in the Wasatch Crest policy. 
At worst, they evidence an attempt to comply with the 
nominal requirements of the law while at the same time 
circumventing the actual requirement of providing cov-
erage regardless of whether a beneficiary is also covered 
by Medicaid. Under either scenario, we interpret the 
Wasatch Crest plan in favor of coverage. Since Hayden 
is a beneficiary of the Wasatch Crest plan, he, and 
through him his mother Ms. Mellor, have standing to 
pursue an action for recovery of benefits owing to Hay-
den under the plan. 
[*P22] Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
[*P23] Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief 
Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring 
concur in Justice Wilkins' opinion. 
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This matter is before the Court on Chris Ann Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
January 21, 2010, and Wasatch Crest Insurance Company in Liquidation's (WCICDL) Motion to 
Dismiss or Stay the Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 27. Both motions were briefed. The 
CQurt held a hearing on August 31, 2010, after which it took the matters under advisement The 
motions arenpw ready for decision. 
BACKGROUND 
Hayden Williams's father terminated his employment with a company in August 2000. Mr. 
Williams elected COBRA coverage to continue his family's "health policy through Wasatch Crest 
Insurance Company ("Wasatch Crest"). The policy was still in place on August 4,2001 when Hayden 
had a near-drowniftg accident Hayden's mother, Chris Ann Mellor, sought and received Medicaid 
coverage for Hayden, granted retroactively to August 1,2001 -just prior to his accident. Ms. Mellor 
wis still paying the COB&A premiums for Hayden, but when Wasatch Crest learned that Hayden was 
receiving Medicaid coverage, it terminated Hayden's policy and sought reimbursement for the medical 
claims it had paid since August 1, 2001, the date Hayden began receiving Medicaid benefits, Ms. 
Mellor, acting on Wasatch Crest's statement that Hayden was no longer eligible for coverage under 
C6BRA, stopped paying the premiums in November, 2001. Meanwhile, Medicaid paid out 
$181;357.51 in reimbursements to Hayden's doctors. 
Ms. Mellor sued Wasatch Crest, arguing that the insurance company unlawfully terminated 
Hayden's coverage. She claims that Hayden was eligible for COBRA coverage through July 31, 
2003.* Ms. Mellor argues that if Wasatch Crest had not wrongfully terminated Hayden's coverage, 
she would have continued paying the COBRA premiums for the foil period of eligibility. 
In 2003 Wasatch Crest was declared insolvent. The Court appointed a liquidator, Wasatch 
Crest Insurance Company in Liquidation ( "WCICIL"), to assess and pay valid claims filed against 
Waptch Crest, including Ms. Mellor's November 2003 claim on behalf of her son Hayden. WCICL 
denied Ms. Mellor's claims via Notices of Determination dated October 2005 and December 2005. 
Thfc Court upheld WCICH/s decision.2 On appeal the Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
"tepns of the Wasatch Crest Plan did not operate to terminate Hayden's coverage as a matter of law 
wh£n Hayden became eligible for Medicaid coverage." Id. at \ 20. On June 29,2010, WCICIL issued 
a Second Amended Notice of Determination in which it again denied Ms. Mellor's claim, this time 
reasoning that "the Claimant has been indemnified by a third party [Medicaid] and thus has suffered 
no {unreimbursed loss[.]" 
In 2002, Ms. Mellor and the Utah Office of Recovery Services ("ORS") entered into a contract 
authorizing ORS as an assignee of Ms. Mellor's rights of recovery against Wasatch Crest.3 See Mellor 
v. fasatch CrestMut Insur. Co., 2009 UT 5, f 4,201 P.3d 1004. 
1
 Hayden was eligible for coverage under COBRA for three years, from August 1,2000 
through July 31,2003. COBRA allows for the extension of the standard time frame of coverage 
for "qualifying events." Here, Mr. Williams's employment termination and his divorce from 
Halyden's mother served as two qualifying events; as such, Hayden was eligible for thirty-six 
months of coverage. 
2
 Judge Timothy R. Hanson originally was the assigned judge on this cage. In January, 
2007 the case was assigned to Judge Kate A. Toomey. 
3
 ORS is the agency implementing Medicaid. 
DISCUSSION 
Ms. Mellor moves this Court for summary judgment, requesting that she be reimbursed for 
claims submitted by Hayden's health care providers and paid by Medicaid between August 1, 2001 
and July 31,2003, She also requests that the Court determine the amount she should be reimbursed 
by WCICIL. Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
int0rrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
geniiine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary 
judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists, viewing the facts 
ancf&ll reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." 
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 IjfT 17, ^ 24, 42 P.3d 379 (citation omitted). "'A 
genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ' 
on any material issue." Ron Shepherd Ins. Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994) (citation 
omitted). WCICIL moves the Court to deny or stay the motion. 
Estoppel 
Ms. Mellor argues that WCICIL should be required to grant her claim for reimbursement of 
expenses fronrAugust I; 2001 through July 31,2003, the period~Hayden would have been eligible for 
COBRA had Wasatch Crest not terminated his policy prematurely and unlawfully. Ms. Mellor claims 
that she detrimentally relied on Wasatch Crest's statement that Hayden was no longer eligible for 
COiBRA benefits as of the date he became eligible for Medicaid, August 1,2001. She argues that if 
I 
Wasatch Crest had not cancelled the policy she would have continued paying the monthly premiums 
through the last date of his eligibility for COBRA coverage. She asks the Court to estop WCICIL from 
defying the benefits Wasatch Crest would have had to pay if it had not led her to believe that her son's 
policy was terminated so that she stopped making payments. See Bowermanv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.* 
1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23325, *42 (it is unreasonable to expect a policy holder to make further 
inquiries after having been given certain advice); National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St Joseph's 
Hosp, oj Atlanta, Inc., 929 F,2d 1558,1566 (11th Cir. 1991) (when a provider misinforms a policy 
holder about her ability to continue coverage and the policy holder relies to her detriment, equitable 
estoppel may hold the provider liable). 
A party asserting a claim for estoppel, must demonstrate: "(1) an admission, statement, or act 
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party in reliance on the 
admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party 
to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State 
Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 728 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted), overruled in part on other 
grounds by State v. Mathis, 2009 UT 85,223 P.3d 1119. Estoppel is a doctrine of equity "to prevent 
oneiparty from deluding or inducing another into a position where he will unjustly suffer loss." FMA 
Fin. Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327, 330 (Utah 1980) (citation omitted). 
Ms. Mellor meets the first two elements for estoppel. Wasatch Crest informed her around 
September or October 2001 that Hayden was no longer eligible for COBRA coverage. Consequently, 
Ms* Mellor stopped paying the monthly premiums. She has a more difficult task demonstrating that 
she or Hayden was injured by Wasatch Crest's actions. Hayden's expenses were covered by 
Medicaid, so she was not forced to pay for expenses due to Wasatch Crest's denial of the policy. Ms 
Mellor argues that she was harmed because Hayden was denied insurance coverage for which her ex-
husjband had contracted with Wasatch Crest. Ultimately it is not important whether Ms. Mellor can 
prove grounds for estoppel because the Court denies her Motion for Summary Judgment on other 
grounds. 
Standing 
WCICIL argues that Ms. Mellor's motion for summary judgment should be denied or at least 
set aside at this time. On July 31,2003, the Court declared that Wasatch Crest was insolvent, ordered 
liquidation of Wasatch Crest, and stayed further proceedings in this lawsuit, Ms. Mellor filed a timely 
claim against with WCICIL pursuant to section 31A-27-328, Utah Code Annotated. WCICIL denied 
her claim in October and December of 2005. It recently issued a Second Amended Notice of 
Determination, again denying Ms. Mellor's claim. WCICIL argues that its determination is essentially 
the jaw of the case because Ms, Mellor's claim in the liquidation proceedings superceded this lawsuit. 
WC[ICIL did not issue the last denial until it filed a Reply in Support of its Motion to Stay or Dismiss 
Ms, Mellor's motion for summary judgment Ms. Mellor, therefore, did not have an opportunity to 
challenge WCICIL's denial of her claim. Ms. Mellor has the option of challenging the latest Notice 
of Extermination, but WCICIL is correct that this case is currently about WCICIL and not Wasatch 
Crest anymore. 
WCICIL further claims that Ms. Mellor is no longer the proper claimant, Medicaid is. Ms. 
Mellor has been reimbursed for her medical expenses and Medicaid is the party seeking to recover 
reimbursement of the money paid out during the period Hayden should have been eligible for COBRA 
coverage, but-Medicaid failed to file a claim with the liquidation estate by the 2004 deadline. 
W&CIL's argument is not well taken. The Collection Agreement between Ms. Mellor and Medicaid 
"does nothing more than place a lien in favor of ORS or any reimbursement for medical expenses that 
r 
may be recovered from Wasatch Crest." Mellor, 2009 UT 5 at f 10. The Collection Agreement 
obligates Ms. Mellor to reimburse ORS for the amount it paid out in Medicaid claims during that time; 
any additional recovery would remain Ms. Mellor's. Ms. Mellor is the proper party. 
Class of Claim 
WCICIL implies that even if Ms. Mellor could advance her claim for reimbursement of 
Hayden's medical expenses, she would be so far down the list of recipients of Wasatch Crest's 
creditors as to practically guarantee no compensation. Utah's Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation 
statute sets forth six levels of distribution of a liquidated company's assets. After the liquidator and 
guaranty associations are paid, Class Three provides reimbursement for "all claims under policies for 
losses incurred" but excludes "[t]hat portion of any loss for which indemnification is provided by other 
benefits or advantages recovered or recoverable by the claimant'' and also excludes "obligations to 
insiirers... and their claims for contribution, indemnity, or subrogation, equitable or otherwise." Utah 
CodeAnn.§31A-27-335(2). 
WCICIL points out that Ms. Mellor is prohibited from a Class Three claim because she was 
indemnified by Medicaid for Hayden's medical expenses. It argues that Ms. Mellor has a Class Six 
claim instead. Class Six covers "any person, including claims of state or local governments, except 
those specifically classified elsewhere in this section[.]" Id. Because Ms. Mellor is excluded from 
ClaSs Three, WCICIL argues, she is relegated to the catch-all of Class Six. 
Ms. Mellor acknowledges that Medicaid paid her son's medical expenses, but that they did so 
only because of Wasatch Crest's bad acts. If Wasatch Crest had not wrongfully terminated Hayden's 
COBRA coverage and Medicaid stepped in, Ms. Mellor would have been a Class Three claimant. The 
fact that Medicaid did step in, however, renders Ms. Mellor's claim a Class Six. Ms, Mellor points 
to public policy suggesting that taxpayers are harmed when a private insurer wrongfully withholds 
benefits, thereby putting the burden on publicly funded programs such as Medicaid. See Mellor, 2009 
UTiiS at \ 17 (noting that federal and state laws "evidence a clear policy of prohibiting insurance 
companies from shifting their obligation for medical expenses to the taxpayer-funded Medicaid 
program"); Rehabilitation Ass'n oj Virginia, Inc. v, Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444,1447 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(Medicaid is the payer of last resort). By misleading Ms. Mellor into terminating her son's insurance 
under COBRA, Wasatch Crest shifted the burden to the taxpayers while saving itself significant 
amounts of money for Hayden's care over the next two years. In this case, the Insurers Rehabilitation 
andlLiquidation statute contravenes an equitable outcome for Ms. Mellor and ORS and consistent with 
the .public policy against burdening the taxpayers. Utah's Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation 
statute specifically provides that "a claim may not circumvent the priority classes through equitable 
•i 
reraiedies." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-335(l)(d). The Court must administer the laws as written 
(Morris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 483 (Utah 1909)), and an attempt to equitably return Ms. 
Metlor to a Class Three, where she would have been if Medicare had not stepped in, is prohibited. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Ms, Mellor's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Ms., Mellor also requests prejudgment interest and attorney fees. The Court is not determining any 
judgment in favor pf Ms. Mellor, so interest and fees are not appropriate. The Court grants WCTCDL's 
Motjion to Stay because when the Court declared Wasatch Crest insolvent, it stayed further proceedings 
in the underlying lawsuit. 
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42 USCS §1396 
§ 1396. Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission 
(a) Establishment. There is hereby established the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (in this sec-
tion referred to as "MACPAC"). 
(b) Duties. 
(1) Review of access policies for all States and annual reports. MACPAC shall-
(A) review policies of the Medicaid program established under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.] (in this section 
referred to as "Medicaid") and the State Children's Health Insurance Program established under title XXI [42 USCS §§ 
1391 aa et seq.] (in this section referred to as "CHIP") affecting access to covered items and services, including topics 
described in paragraph (2); 
(B) make recommendations to Congress, the Secretary, and States concerning such access policies; 
(C) by not later than March 15 of each year (beginning with 2010), submit a report to Congress containing the 
results of such reviews and MACPAC's recommendations concerning such policies; and 
(D) by not later than June 15 of each year (beginning with 2010), submit a report to Congress containing an ex-
amination of issues affecting Medicaid and CHIP, including the implications of changes in health care delivery in the 
United States and in the market for health care services on such programs. 
(2) Specific topics to be reviewed. Specifically, MACPAC shall review and assess the following: 
(A) Medicaid and CHIP payment policies. Payment policies under Medicaid and CHIP, including-
(i) the factors affecting expenditures for the efficient provision of items and services in different sectors, in-
cluding the process for updating payments to medical, dental, and health professionals, hospitals, residential and 
long-term care providers, providers of home and community based services, Federally-qualified health centers and rural 
health clinics, managed care entities, and providers of other covered items and services; 
(ii) payment methodologies; and 
(iii) the relationship of such factors and methodologies to access and quality of care for Medicaid and CHIP 
beneficiaries (including how such factors and methodologies enable such beneficiaries to obtain the services for which 
they are eligible, affect provider supply, and affect providers that serve a disproportionate share of low-income and oth-
er vulnerable populations). 
(B) Eligibility policies. Medicaid and CHIP eligibility policies, including a determination of the degree to which 
Federal and State policies provide health care coverage to needy populations. 
(C) Enrollment and retention processes. Medicaid and CHIP enrollment and retention processes, including a de-
termination of the degree to which Federal and State policies encourage the enrollment of individuals who are eligible 
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for such programs and screen out individuals who are ineligible, while minimizing the share of program expenses de-
voted to such processes. 
(D) Coverage policies. Medicaid and CHIP benefit and coverage policies, including a determination of the degree 
to which Federal and State policies provide access to the services enrollees require to improve and maintain their health 
and functional status. 
(E) Quality of care. Medicaid and CHIP policies as they relate to the quality of care provided under those pro-
grams, including a determination of the degree to which Federal and State policies achieve their stated goals and interact 
with similar goals established by other purchasers of health care services. 
(F) Interaction of Medicaid and CHIP payment policies with health care delivery generally. The effect of Medi-
caid and CHIP payment policies on access to items and services for children and other Medicaid and CHIP populations 
other than under this title or title XXI [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq. or 1397aa et seq.] and the implications of changes in 
health care delivery in the United States and in the general market for health care items and services on Medicaid and 
CHIP. 
(G) Interactions with Medicare and Medicaid. Consistent with paragraph (11), the interaction of policies under 
Medicaid and the Medicare program under title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395 et seq.], including with respect to how such 
interactions affect access to services, payments, and dual eligible individuals. 
(H) Other access policies. The effect of other Medicaid and CHIP policies on access to covered items and servic-
es, including policies relating to transportation and language barriers and preventive, acute, and long-term services and 
supports. 
(3) Recommendations and reports of State-specific data. MACPAC shall— 
(A) review national and State-specific Medicaid and CHIP data; and 
(B) submit reports and recommendations to Congress, the Secretary, and States based on such reviews. 
(4) Creation of early-warning system. MACPAC shall create an early-warning system to identify provider shortage 
areas, as well as other factors that adversely affect, or have the potential to adversely affect, access to care by, or the 
health care status of, Medicaid and CHIP beneficiaries. MACPAC shall include in the annual report required under pa-
ragraph (1)(D) a description of all such areas or problems identified with respect to the period addressed in the report. 
(5) Comments on certain secretarial reports and regulations. 
(A) Certain secretarial reports. If the Secretary submits to Congress (or a committee of Congress) a report that is 
required by law and that relates to access policies, including with respect to payment policies, under Medicaid or CHIP, 
the Secretary shall transmit a copy of the report to MACPAC. MACPAC shall review the report and, not later than 6 
months after the date of submittal of the Secretary's report to Congress, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress and the Secretary written comments on such report. Such comments may include such recommendations as 
MACPAC deems appropriate. 
(B) Regulations. MACPAC shall review Medicaid and CHIP regulations and may comment through submission 
of a report to the appropriate committees of Congress and the Secretary, on any such regulations that affect access, 
quality, or efficiency of health care. 
(6) Agenda and additional reviews. MACPAC shall consult periodically with the chairmen and ranking minority 
members of the appropriate committees of Congress regarding MACPAC's agenda and progress towards achieving the 
agenda. MACPAC may conduct additional reviews, and submit additional reports to the appropriate committees of 
Congress, from time to time on such topics relating to the program under this title or title XXI [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq. 
or 1397aa et seq.] as may be requested by such chairmen and members and as MACPAC deems appropriate. 
(7) Availability of reports. MACPAC shall transmit to the Secretary a copy of each report submitted under this sub-
section and shall make such reports available to the public. 
(8) Appropriate committee of Congress. For purposes of this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" 
means the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the 
Senate. 
(9) Voting and reporting requirements. With respect to each recommendation contained in a report submitted under 
paragraph (1), each member of MACPAC shall vote on the recommendation, and MACPAC shall include, by member, 
the results of that vote in the report containing the recommendation. 
(10) Examination of budget consequences. Before making any recommendations, MACPAC shall examine the 
budget consequences of such recommendations, directly or through consultation with appropriate expert entities, and 
shall submit with any recommendations, a report on the Federal and State-specific budget consequences of the recom-
mendations. 
(11) Consultation and coordination with MedPAC. 
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(A) In general. MACPAC shall consult with the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (in this paragraph re-
ferred to as "MedPAC") established under section 1805 [42 USCS § 1395b-6] in carrying out its duties under this sec-
tion, as appropriate and particularly with respect to the issues specified in paragraph (2) as they relate to those Medicaid 
beneficiaries who are dually eligible for Medicaid and the Medicare program under title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395 et 
seq.], adult Medicaid beneficiaries (who are not dually eligible for Medicare), and beneficiaries under Medicare. Re-
sponsibility for analysis of and recommendations to change Medicare policy regarding Medicare beneficiaries, includ-
ing Medicare beneficiaries who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, shall rest with MedPAC. 
(B) Information sharing. MACPAC and MedPAC shall have access to deliberations and records of the other such 
entity, respectively, upon the request of the other such entity. 
(12) Consultation with States. MACPAC shall regularly consult with States in carrying out its duties under this sec-
tion, including with respect to developing processes for carrying out such duties, and shall ensure that input from States 
is taken into account and represented in MACPACs recommendations and reports. 
(13) Coordinate and consult with the Federal Coordinated Health Care Office. MACPAC shall coordinate and con-
sult with the Federal Coordinated Health Care Office established under section 2081 [2602] of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act [42 USCS § 1315b] before making any recommendations regarding dual eligible individuals. 
(14) Programmatic oversight vested in the Secretary. MACPACs authority to make recommendations in accordance 
with this section shall not affect, or be considered to duplicate, the Secretary's authority to carry out Federal responsibil-
ities with respect to Medicaid and CHIP. 
(c) Membership. 
(1) Number and appointment. MACPAC shall be composed of 17 members appointed by the Comptroller General of 
the United States. 
(2) Qualifications. 
(A) In general. The membership of MACPAC shall include individuals who have had direct experience as enrol-
lees or parents or caregivers of enrollees in Medicaid or CHIP and individuals with national recognition for their exper-
tise in Federal safety net health programs, health finance and economics, actuarial science, health plans and integrated 
delivery systems, reimbursement for health care, health information technology, and other providers of health services, 
public health, and other related fields, who provide a mix of different professions, broad geographic representation, and 
a balance between urban and rural representation. 
(B) Inclusion. The membership of MACPAC shall include (but not be limited to) physicians, dentists, and other 
health professionals, employers, third-party payers, and individuals with expertise in the delivery of health services. 
Such membership shall also include representatives of children, pregnant women, the elderly, individuals with disabili-
ties, caregivers, and dual eligible individuals, current or former representatives of State agencies responsible for admi-
nistering Medicaid, and current or former representatives of State agencies responsible for administering CHIP. 
(C) Majority nonproviders. Individuals who are directly involved in the provision, or management of the delivery, 
of items and services covered under Medicaid or CHIP shall not constitute a majority of the membership of MACPAC. 
(D) Ethical disclosure. The Comptroller General of the United States shall establish a system for public disclosure 
by members of MACPAC of financial and other potential conflicts of interest relating to such members. Members of 
MACPAC shall be treated as employees of Congress for purposes of applying title I of the Ethics in Government Act of 
1978 [5 USCSAppx. §§ 101 et seq.] (Public Law 95-521). 
(3) Terms. 
(A) In general. The terms of members of MACPAC shall be for 3 years except that the Comptroller General of the 
United States shall designate staggered terms for the members first appointed. 
(B) Vacancies. Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term for which the 
member's predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of that term. A member may serve after 
the expiration of that member's term until a successor has taken office. A vacancy in MACPAC shall be filled in the 
manner in which the original appointment was made. 
(4) Compensation. While serving on the business of MACPAC (including travel time), a member of MACPAC shall 
be entitled to compensation at the per diem equivalent of the rate provided for level IV of the Executive Schedule under 
section 5315 of title 5, United States Code; and while so serving away from home and the member's regular place of 
business, a member may be allowed travel expenses, as authorized by the Chairman of MACPAC. Physicians serving as 
personnel of MACPAC may be provided a physician comparability allowance by MACPAC in the same manner as 
Government physicians may be provided such an allowance by an agency under section 5948 of title 5, United States 
Code, and for such purpose subsection (i) of such section shall apply to MACPAC in the same manner as it applies to 
the Tennessee Valley Authority. For purposes of pay (other than pay of members of MACPAC) and employment bene-
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fits, rights, and privileges, all personnel of MACPAC shall be treated as if they were employees of the United States 
Senate. 
(5) Chairman; Vice Chairman. The Comptroller General of the United States shall designate a member of MACPAC, 
at the time of appointment of the member as Chairman and a member as Vice Chairman for that term of appointment, 
except that in the case of vacancy of the Chairmanship or Vice Chairmanship, the Comptroller General of the United 
States may designate another member for the remainder of that member's term. 
(6) Meetings. MACPAC shall meet at the call of the Chairman. 
(d) Director and staff; experts and consultants. Subject to such review as the Comptroller General of the United States 
deems necessary to assure the efficient administration of MACPAC, MACPAC may— 
(1) employ and fix the compensation of an Executive Director (subject to the approval of the Comptroller General of 
the United States) and such other personnel as may be necessary to carry out its duties (without regard to the provisions 
of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service); 
(2) seek such assistance and support as may be required in the performance of its duties from appropriate Federal and 
State departments and agencies; 
(3) enter into contracts or make other arrangements, as may be necessary for the conduct of the work of MACPAC 
(without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5)); 
(4) make advance, progress, and other payments which relate to the work of MACPAC; 
(5) provide transportation and subsistence for persons serving without compensation; and 
(6) prescribe such rules and regulations as it deems necessary with respect to the internal organization and operation 
of MACPAC. 
(e) Powers. 
(1) Obtaining official data. MACPAC may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States and, 
as a condition for receiving payments under sections 1903(a) and 2105(a) [42 USCS §§ 1396b(a) and 1397ee(a)]9 from 
any State agency responsible for administering Medicaid or CHIP, information necessary to enable it to carry out this 
section. Upon request of the Chairman, the head of that department or agency shall furnish that information to MAC-
PAC on an agreed upon schedule. 
(2) Data collection. In order to carry out its functions, MACPAC shall— 
(A) utilize existing information, both published and unpublished, where possible, collected and assessed either by 
its own staff or under other arrangements made in accordance with this section; 
(B) carry out, or award grants or contracts for, original research and experimentation, where existing information 
is inadequate; and 
(C) adopt procedures allowing any interested party to submit information for MACPAC's use in making reports 
and recommendations. 
(3) Access of GAO to information. The Comptroller General of the United States shall have unrestricted access to all 
deliberations, records, and nonproprietary data of MACPAC, immediately upon request. 
(4) Periodic audit. MACPAC shall be subject to periodic audit by the Comptroller General of the United States. 
(f) Funding. 
(1) Request for appropriations. MACPAC shall submit requests for appropriations (other than for fiscal year 2010) in 
the same manner as the Comptroller General of the United States submits requests for appropriations, but amounts ap-
propriated for MACPAC shall be separate from amounts appropriated for the Comptroller General of the United States. 
(2) Authorization. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this section. 
(3) Funding for fiscal year 2010. 
(A) In general. Out of any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, there is appropriated to MACPAC to 
carry out the provisions of this section for fiscal year 2010, $ 9,000,000. 
(B) Transfer of funds. Notwithstanding section 2104(a)(13) [42 USCS § 139?'dd(a) (13)], from the amounts ap-
propriated in such section for fiscal year 2010, $ 2,000,000 is hereby transferred and made available in such fiscal year 
to MACPAC to carry out the provisions of this section. 
(4) Availability. Amounts made available under paragraphs (2) and (3) to MACPAC to carry out the provisions of 
this section shall remain available until expended. 
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26-19-1. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Medical Benefits Recovery Act." 1981 
26-19-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Annuity" shall have the same meaning as provided 
in Section 31A-1-301. 
(2) "Claim" means: 
(a) a request or demand for payment; or 
(b) a cause of action for money or damages arising 
under any law. 
(3) "Employee welfare benefit plan" means a medical 
insurance plan developed by an employer under 29 U.S.C. 
Section 1001, et seq., the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 as amended. 
(4) "Estate" means, regarding a deceased recipient: 
(a) all real and personal property or other assets 
included within a decedent's estate as defined in 
Section 75-1-201; 
(b) the decedent's augmented estate as defined in 
Section 75-2-203; and 
(c) that part of other real or personal property in 
which the decedent had a legal interest at the time of 
death including assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign of the decedent through joint tenancy, tenancy 
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or 
other arrangement. 
(5) "Insurer" includes: 
(a) a group health plan as defined in Subsection 
607(1) of the federal Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974; 
(b) a health maintenance organization; and 
(c) any entity offering a health service benefit plan. 
(6) "Medical assistance" means: 
(a) all funds expended for the benefit of a recipient 
under Title 26, Chapter 18, Medical Assistance Act, or 
under Titles XVIII and XIX, federal Social Security 
Act; and 
(b) any other services provided for the benefit of a 
recipient by a prepaid health care delivery system 
under contract with the department. 
(7) "Office of Recovery Services" means the Office of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Ser-
vices. 
(8) "Provider" means a person or entity who provides 
services to a recipient. 
(9) "Recipient" means: 
(a) a person who has applied for or received med-
ical assistance from the state; 
(b) the guardian, conservator, or other personal 
representative of a person under Subsection (9)(a) if 
the person is a minor or an incapacitated person; or 
(c) the estate and survivors of a person under 
Subsection (9)(a) if the person is deceased. 
(10) "State plan" means the state Medicaid program as 
enacted in accordance with Title XEX, federal Social 
Security Act. 
(11) "Third party" includes: 
(a) an individual, institution, corporation, public 
or private agency, trust, estate, insurance carrier, 
employee welfare benefit plan, health maintenance 
organization, health service organization, preferred 
provider organization, governmental program such 
as Medicare, CHAMPUS, and workers' compensa-
tion, which may be obligated to pay all or part of the 
medical costs of injury, disease, or disability of a 
recipient, unless any of these are excluded by depart-
ment rule; and 
(b) a spouse or a parent who: 
(i) may be obligated to pay all or par t of the 
medical costs of a recipient under law or by court 
or administrative order; or 
(ii) has been ordered to maintain health, den-
tal, or accident and health insurance to cover 
medical expenses of a spouse or dependent child 
by court or administrative order. 
(12) "Trust" shall have the same meaning as provided 
in Section 75-1-201. 2005 
26-19-3. Program established by department — Pro-
mulgation of rules. 
(1) The department shall establish and maintain a program 
for the recoupment of medical assistance. 
(2) The department may promulgate rules to implement 
the purposes of this chapter. 1984 
26-19-4. Repealed. 1984 
26-19-4.5. Assignment of rights to benefits. 
(1) (a) To the extent that medical assistance is actually 
provided to a recipient, all benefits for medical services or 
payments from a third party otherwise payable to or on 
behalf of a recipient are assigned by operation of law to 
the department if the department provides, or becomes 
obligated to provide, medical assistance, regardless of 
who made application for the benefits on behalf of the 
recipient. 
(b) The assignment: 
(i) authorizes the department to submit its claim 
to the third party and authorizes payment of benefits 
directly to the department; and 
(ii) is effective for all medical assistance. 
(2) The department may recover the assigned benefits or 
payments in accordance with Section 26-19-5 and as otherwise 
provided by law. 
(3) The assignment of benefits includes medical support 
and third party payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged by 
any court of this state or any other state or territory of the 
United States. That assignment is not in lieu of, and does not 
supersede or alter any other court order, decree, or judgment. 
(4) When an assignment takes effect, the recipient is enti-
tled to receive medical assistance, and the benefits paid to the 
department are a reimbursement to the department. 1998 
26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third 
party — Lien — Notice — Action — Compro-
mise or waiver — Recipient's right to action 
protected. 
(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated 
to provide medical assistance to a recipient t ha t a third 
party is obligated to pay for, the department may recover 
the medical assistance directly from that third party. 
(b) Any claim arising under Subsection (l)(a) or Section 
26-19-4.5 to recover medical assistance provided to a 
recipient is a lien against any proceeds payable to or on 
behalf of the recipient by that third party. This lien has 
priority over all other claims to the proceeds, except 
claims for attorney's fees and costs authorized under 
Subsection 26-19-7(2)(c)(ii). 
(2) (a) The department shall mail or deliver written notice 
of its claim or lien to the third party at its principal place 
of business or last-known address. 
(b) The notice shall include: 
(i) the recipient's name; 
(ii) the approximate date of illness or injury; 
(hi) a general description of the type of illness or 
injury; and 
(iv) if applicable, the general location where the 
injury is alleged to have occurred. 
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(3) The department may commence an action on its claim or 
lien in its own name, but that claim or lien is not enforceable 
as to a third party unless: 
(a) the third party receives written notice of the depart-
ment's claim or lien before it settles with the recipient; or 
(b) the department has evidence that the third party 
had knowledge that the department provided or was 
obligated to provide medical assistance. 
(4) The department may: 
(a) waive a claim or lien against a third party in whole 
or in part; or 
(b) compromise, settle, or release a claim or lien. 
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an 
action by a recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or 
damage not included in the department's action. 
(6) The department's claim or lien on proceeds under this 
section is not affected by the transfer of the proceeds to a trust, 
annuity, financial account, or other financial instrument. 
2005 
26-19-6. Action by department — Notice to recipient. 
(1) (a) Within 30 days after commencing an action under 
Subsection 26-19-5(3), the department shall give the 
recipient, his guardian, personal representative, trustee, 
estate, or survivor, whichever is appropriate, written 
notice of the action by: 
(i) personal service or certified mail to the last 
known address of the person receiving the notice; or 
(ii) if no last-known address is available, by pub-
Hshing a notice once a week for three successive 
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
county where the recipient resides. 
(b) Proof of service shall be filed in the action. 
(c) The recipient may intervene in the department's 
action at any time before trial. 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall name the 
court in which the action is commenced and advise the 
recipient of: 
(a) the right to intervene in the proceeding; 
(b) the right to obtain a private attorney; and 
(c) the department's right to recover medical assistance 
directly from the third party. 2004 
26-19-7. Notice of claim by recipient — Department 
response — Conditions for proceeding — Col-
lection agreements — Department's right to 
intervene — Department's interests protected 
— Remitting funds — Disbursements — Lia-
bility and penalty for noncompliance. 
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an 
action, or settle, compromise, release, or waive a claim 
against a third party for recovery of medical costs for an 
injury, disease, or disability for which the department has 
provided or has become obligated to provide medical 
assistance, without the department's written consent as 
provided in Subsection (2)(b) or (4). 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (l)(a), consent may be 
obtained if: 
(i) a recipient who files a claim, or commences an 
action against a third party notifies the department 
in accordance with Subsection (l)(d) within ten days 
of making his claim or commencing an action; or 
(ii) an attorney, who has been retained by the 
recipient to file a claim, or commence an action 
against a third party, notifies the department in 
accordance with Subsection (l>(d) of the recipient's 
claim: 
(A) within 30 days after being retained by the 
va^-irviont •fny +Vl« + nnrnnQP* CiV 
(B) within 30 days from the date the attorney 
either knew or should have known that the 
recipient received medical assistance from the 
department. 
(c) Service of the notice of claim to the department 
shall be made by certified mail, personal service, or by 
e-mail in accordance with Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to the director of the Office of Recovery Ser-
vices. 
(d) The notice of claim shall include the following 
information: 
(i) the name of the recipient; 
(ii) the recipient's Social Security number; 
(iii) the recipient's date of birth; 
(iv) the name of the recipient's attorney if applica-
ble; 
(v) the name or names of individuals or entities 
against whom the recipient is making the claim, if 
known; 
(vi) the name of the third party's insurance carrier, 
if known; 
(vii) the date of the incident giving rise to the 
claim; and 
(viii) a short statement identifying the nature of 
the recipient's claim. 
(2) (a) Within 30 days of receipt of the notice of the claim 
required in Subsection (1), the department shall acknowl-
edge receipt of the notice of the claim to the recipient or 
the recipient's attorney and shall notify the recipient or 
the recipient's attorney in writing of the following: 
(i) if the department has a claim or lien pursuant 
to Section 26-19-5 or has become obligated to provide 
medical assistance; and 
(ii) whether the department is denying or granting 
written consent in accordance with Subsection (l)(a). 
(b) The department shall provide the recipient's attor-
ney the opportunity to enter into a collection agreement 
with the department, with the recipient's consent, unless: 
(i) the department, prior to the receipt of the notice 
of the recipient's claim pursuant to Subsection (1), 
filed a written claim with the third party, the third 
party agreed to make payment to the department 
before the date the department received notice of the 
recipient's claim, and the agreement is documented 
in the department's record; or 
(ii) there has been a failure by the recipient's 
attorney to comply with any provision of this section 
by: 
(A) failing to comply with the notice provisions 
of this section; 
(B) failing or refusing to enter into a collection 
agreement; 
(C) failing to comply with the terms of a col-
lection agreement with the department; or 
(D) failing to disburse funds owed to the state 
in accordance with this section. 
(c) (i) The collection agreement shall be: 
(A) consistent with this section and the attor-
ney's obligation to represent the recipient and 
represent the state's claim; and 
(B) state the terms under which the interests 
of the department may be represented in an 
action commenced by the recipient. 
(ii) If the recipient's attorney enters into a written 
collection agreement with the department, or in-
cludes the department's claim in the recipient's claim 
or action pursuant to Subsection (4), the department 
shall pay attorney's fees at the rate of 33.3% of the 
department's total recovery and shall pay a propor-
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tionate share of the litigation expenses directly re-
lated to the action, 
(d) The department is not required to enter into a 
collection agreement with the recipient's attorney for 
collection of personal injury protection under Subsection 
31A-22-302C2). 
(3) (a) If the department receives notice pursuant to Sub-
section (1), and notifies the recipient and the recipient's 
attorney that the department will not enter into a collec-
tion agreement with the recipient's attorney, the recipient 
may proceed with the recipient's claim or action against 
the third party if the recipient excludes from the claim: 
(i) any medical expenses paid by the department; 
or 
(ii) any medical costs for which the department is 
obligated to provide medical assistance, 
(b) When a recipient proceeds with a claim under 
Subsection (3)(a), the recipient shall provide written no-
tice to the third party of the exclusion of the department's 
claim for expenses under Subsection (3)(a)(i) or (ii). 
(4) If the department receives notice pursuant to Subsec-
tion (1), and does not respond within 30 days to the recipient 
or the recipient's attorney, the recipient or the recipient's 
attorney: 
(a) may proceed with the recipient's claim or action 
against the third party; 
(b) may include the state's claim in the recipient's claim 
or action; and 
(c) may not negotiate, compromise, settle, or waive the 
department's claim without the department's consent. 
(5) The department has an unconditional right to intervene 
in an action commenced by a recipient against a third party for 
the purpose of recovering medical costs for which the depart-
ment has provided or has become obligated to provide medical 
assistance. 
(6) (a) If the recipient proceeds without complying with the 
provisions of this section, the department is not bound by 
any decision, judgment, agreement, settlement, or com-
promise rendered or made on the claim or in the action. 
(b) The department may recover in full from the recip-
ient or any party to which the proceeds were made 
payable all medical assistance which it has provided and 
retains its right to commence an independent action 
against the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3). 
(7) Any amounts assigned to and recoverable by the depart-
ment pursuant to Sections 26-19-4.5 and 26-19-5 collected 
directly by the recipient shall be remitted to the Bureau of 
Medical Collections within the Office of Recovery Services no 
later than five business days after receipt. 
(8) (a) Any amounts assigned to and recoverable by the 
department pursuant to Sections 26-19-4.5 and 26-19-5 
collected directly by the recipient's attorney must be 
remitted to the Bureau of Medical Collections within the 
Office of Recovery Services no later than 30 days after the 
funds are placed in the attorney's trust account. 
(b) The date by which the funds must be remitted to 
the department may be modified based on agreement 
between the department and the recipient's attorney. 
(c) The department's consent to another date for remit-
tance may not be unreasonably withheld. 
(d) If the funds are received by the recipient's attorney, 
no disbursements shall be made to the recipient or the 
recipient's attorney until the department's claim has been 
paid. 
(9) A recipient or recipient's attorney who knowingly and 
intentionally fails to comply with this section is liable to the 
department for: 
(a) the amount of the department's claim or lien pur-
suant to Subsection (5); 
(b) a penalty equal to 10% of the amount of the depart-
ment's claim; and 
(c) attorney's fees and litigation expenses related to 
recovering the department's claim. 2005 
26-19-8. Statute of limitations — Survival of right of 
action — Insurance policy not to limit time 
allowed for recovery. 
(1) (a) An action commenced by the department under this 
chapter against a health insurance carrier or employee 
welfare benefit plan must be commenced within: 
(i) two years after the date of the injury or onset of 
the illness; or 
(ii) six months after the date of the last payment 
for medical assistance, whichever is later, 
(b) An action against any other third party, the recipi-
ent, or anyone to whom the proceeds are payable must be 
commenced within: 
(i) four years after the date of the injury or onset of 
the illness; or 
(ii) six months after the date of the last payment 
for medical assistance, whichever is later. 
(2) The death of the recipient does not abate any right of 
action established by this chapter. 
(3) No insurance policy issued or renewed after June 1, 
1981, may contain any provision that limits the time in which 
the department may submit its claim to recover medical 
assistance benefits to a period of less than 24 months from the 
date the provider furnishes services or goods to the recipient. 
(4) The provisions of this section do not apply to Section 
26-19-13.5. 
(5) The provisions of this section supercede any other 
sections regarding the time limit in which an action must be 
commenced, including Section 75-7-509. 2004 
26-19-9. Employee benefit plans. 
As allowed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1144, an employee 
benefit plan may not include any provision tha t has the effect 
of limiting or excluding coverage or payment for any health 
care for an individual who would otherwise be covered or 
entitled to benefits or services under the terms of the employee 
benefit plan based on the fact that the individual is eligible for 
or is provided services under the state plan. 1993 
26-19-9.5. Availability of insurance policy. 
If the third party does not pay the department's claim or lien 
within 30 days from the date the claim or lien is received, the 
third party shall: 
(1) provide a written explanation if the claim is denied; 
(2) specifically describe and request any additional 
information from the department that is necessary to 
process the claim; and 
(3) provide the department or its agent a copy of any 
relevant or applicable insurance or benefit policy. 2004 
26-19-9.7. Legal recognition of electronic claims 
records. 
Pursuant to Title 46, Chapter 4, Uniform Electronic Trans-
actions Act: 
(1) a claim submitted to the department for payment 
may not be denied legal effect, enforceability, or admissi-
bility as evidence in any court in any civil action because 
it is in electronic form; and 
(2) a third party shall accept an electronic record of 
payments by the department for medical services on 
behalf of a recipient as evidence in support of the depart-
ment's claim. 2004 
26-19-10 to 26-19-13. Repealed. 1984,1998 
26-19-13.5. Estate and trust recovery. 
(1) Upon a recipient's death, the department may recover 
from the recipient's estate and any trust, in which the recipi-
1 INSURANCE CODE 31A-27-335 
ditor. Any excess received by the creditor shall be held in 
st for the other person. As used in this section, "another 
•son" or "other person" does not apply to a guaranty fund or 
ociation. 1986 
V-27-334. Secured claims. 
1) An allowed claim of a creditor that is secured by a hen 
property in which the insurer who is subject to a liquidation 
an interest, or that is subject to setoff under Section 
L-27-323, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of the 
litor's interest in the insurer's interest in the property or to 
extent of the amount subject to setoff. 
I) The value of any security for a claim is determined 
ler the supervision and control of the court: 
(a) by converting it into money according to the terms 
of the agreement under which the security was granted to 
or retained by the creditor; or 
(b) by agreement, arbitration, compromise, or litigation 
between the creditor and the liquidator. 
t) The net amount received under Subsection (2)(a) or the 
>unt determined under Subsection (2Kb) shall be credited 
a the secured claim, and any deficiency shall be allowed as 
msecured claim. If the claimant surrenders the security to 
liquidator, the entire claim shall be allowed as if unse-
id. 1986 
-27-335. Priori ty of distribution. 
) (a) Every claim in each class of claims from the insur-
er's estate shall be paid in full or adequate funds retained 
for the payment before the members of the next class 
receive any payment. 
(b) Once the funds are retained by the liquidator and 
approved by the court, the insurer's estate shall have no 
further liability to members of that class except to the 
extent of the retained funds and any other undistributed 
funds. 
(c) Subclasses may not be established within any class. 
(d) A claim by a shareholder, policyholder, or other 
creditor may not be permitted to circumvent the priority 
classes through the use of equitable remedies. 
The classes and order of distribution are as described in 
ections (2)(a) through (i). 
(a) Class one is the costs and expenses of administra-
tion expressly approved by the liquidator, including: 
(i) the actual and necessary costs of preserving or 
recovering the assets of the insurer; 
(ii) compensation for all authorized services ren-
dered in the supervision, rehabilitation, or liqui-
dation; 
(iii) any necessary filing fees; 
(iv) the fees and mileage payable to witnesses; and 
(v) reasonable attorney's fees and other profes-
sional services rendered in the supervision, rehabili-
tation, or liquidation. 
(b) (i) Class two is the administrative expenses of 
guaranty associations. 
(ii) For purposes of this section, "administrative 
expenses of a guaranty association" means the rea-
sonable expenses incurred by a guaranty association: 
(A) when the expenses are not payments or 
expenses that are required to be incurred as 
direct policy benefits in fulfillment of the terms of 
the insurance contract or policy; and 
(B) that are of the type and nature that, but 
for the activities of the guaranty association, 
otherwise would have been incurred by the liqui-
dator, including: 
(I) evaluations of policy coverage; 
(II) activities involved in the adjustment 
and settlement of claims under policies, in-
cluding those of in-house or outside adjust-
ers; and 
(III) the reasonable expenses incurred in 
connection with the arrangements for ongo-
ing coverage through transfer to other insur-
ers, policy exchanges, or maintaining poli-
cies in force, 
(iii) The liquidator may in the liquidator's sole 
discretion approve as an administrative expense of a 
guaranty association any other reasonable expenses 
of the guaranty association if the liquidator finds: 
(A) the expenses are not expenses required to 
be paid or incurred as direct policy benefits by 
the terms of the policy; and 
(B) the expenses were incurred in furtherance 
of activities that provided material economic 
benefit to the estate as a whole, irrespective of 
whether the activities resulted m additional ben-
efits to covered claimants. 
(iv) The court shall approve the expenses approved 
by the liquidator under Subsection (2)(b)(iii) unless 
the court finds the liquidator abused the liquidator's 
discretion in approving the expenses, 
(c) (i) Class three is all claims under policies for losses 
incurred including: 
(A) claims of the federal, state, or local govern-
ment; 
(B) third party claims; 
(C) claims for unearned premiums; and 
(D) claims of a guaranty association, other 
than those included in class two, including 
claims for payment of covered claims or covered 
obligations of the insurer. 
(ii) All claims under life and health insurance and 
annuity policies shall be treated as loss claims. 
(iii) That portion of any loss for which indemnifi-
cation is provided by other benefits or advantages 
recovered or recoverable by the claimant are not 
included in this class, other than benefits or advan-
tages recovered or recoverable in discharge of familial 
obligations of support, by way of succession at death, 
as proceeds of life insurance, or as gratuities. A 
payment made by an employer to the employer's 
employee may not be treated as a gratuity. 
(iv) Notwithstanding Subsections (2)(c)(i), (ii), and 
(iii), the following claims shall be excluded from class 
three priority: 
(A) obligations of the insolvent insurer arising 
out of reinsurance contracts; 
(B) obligations incurred after: 
(I) the expiration date of the insurance 
policy; 
(II) the policy has been replaced by the 
insured; 
(III) the policy has been canceled at the 
insured's request; or 
(IV) the policy has been canceled as pro-
vided in the chapter; 
(C) obligations to insurers, insurance pools, or 
underwriting associations and their claims for 
contribution, indemnity, or subrogation, equita-
ble or otherwise; 
(D) any claim that is in excess of any applica-
ble limits provided in the insurance policy issued 
by the insolvent insurer; 
(E) any amount accrued as punitive or exem-
plary damages unless expressly covered under 
the terms of the policy; and 
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(F) tort claims of any kind against the insurer, 
and claims against the insurer for bad faith or 
wrongful settlement practices. 
(v) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(c)(iv)(B), un-
earned premium claims on policies, other than rein-
surance agreements, may not be excluded. 
(d) Class four is claims of the federal government other 
than those claims included under class three. 
(e) (i) Class five is debts due employees for services, 
benefits, contractual or otherwise due, arising out of 
reasonable compensation to employees for services 
performed: 
(A) to the extent that they: 
(I) do not exceed two months of monetary 
compensation; and 
(II) represent payment for services per-
formed within six months before the filing of 
the petition for liquidation; or 
(B) if rehabilitation preceded liquidation, 
within one year before the filing of the petition 
for rehabilitation. 
(ii) Principal officers and directors are not entitled 
to the benefit of class five priority except as otherwise 
approved by the liquidator and the court. 
(iii) Class five priority shall be in lieu of any other 
similar priority that may be authorized by law as to 
wages or compensation of employees. 
(f) (i) Class six is claims of: 
(A) any person, including claims of state or 
local governments, except those specifically clas-
sified elsewhere in this section; or 
(B) attorneys for fees and expenses owed them 
by a person for services rendered in opposing a 
formal delinquency proceeding. 
(ii) To prove the claim for attorneys' fees and 
expenses, the claimant shall show that: 
(A) the insurer that is the subject of the delin-
quency proceeding incurred the fees and ex-
penses based on its best knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry indi-
cating opposition was: 
(I) in the best interests of the person; 
(II) well grounded in fact; and 
(III) warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modifica-
tion, or reversal of existing law; and 
(B) opposition was not pursued for any im-
proper purpose, such as to: 
(I) harass; 
(II) cause unnecessary delay; or 
(III) cause needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. 
(g) (i) Class seven is claims of any state or local gov-
ernment for a penalty or forfeiture, but only to the 
extent of the pecuniary loss sustained from the act, 
transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or 
forfeiture arose, including the reasonable and actual 
costs incurred from the act, transaction, or proceed-
ing. 
(ii) The remainder of the claims shall be postponed 
to class eight claims, 
(h) Class eight is: 
(i) surplus or contribution notes or similar obliga-
tions; 
(ii) premium refunds on assessable policies; 
(iii) interest on claims of classes one through 
seven; and 
(iv) any other claims specifically subordinated to 
this class. 
(i) Class nine is claims of shareholders or other owners, including policyholders of a mutual insurance corpora™* * 
within the limits of Subsection 31A-27-337(4)(b) except ** 
they may be qualified in class three or four. 
(3) (a) If the liquidator determines that the assets of th 
estate will be sufficient to pay all class one claims in foil 
class two claims shall be paid currently, only after th 
liquidator secures from each of the guaranty association 
receiving disbursements under this section an agreement 
to return to the liquidator the disbursements, together 
with investment income actually earned on the disburse, 
ments, as may be required to pay class one claims. 
(b) A guaranty association entering into an agreement 
under Subsection (3)(a) may not be required to post a 
bond. 
(4) As to a nonprofit corporation organized and operating 
under Chapter 7 with assets not fully liquidated under Sub-
sections (1) and (2), the remaining assets shall be distributed 
under Subsections 16-6a-1405(l)(b) and (c) and Subsection 
16-6a-1405(2). 
(5) (a) If any claimant of this state, another state, oi 
foreign country is entitled to or receives a distribution 
upon the claimant's claim out of a statutory deposit or the 
proceeds of any bond or other asset located in anothei 
state or foreign country, unless the deposit or proceeds 
shall have been delivered to the domiciliary liquidator 
the claimant is not entitled to any further distribution 
from the liquidator until and unless all other claimants oj 
the same class, irrespective of residence or place of the 
acts or contracts upon which their claims are based, shal 
have received an equal distribution upon their claims. 
(b) After the equalization under Subsection (5)(a), the 
claimants of the same class are entitled to share in the 
further distributions by the liquidator, along with and like 
all other creditors of the same class, wherever the claim 
ants reside. 
(6) Upon the declaration of a distribution, the liquidate)] 
shall apply the amount of the distribution against any indebt 
edness owed to the insurer by the person entitled to th< 
distribution. There shall be no claim allowed for and deduct 
ible charged by a guaranty association or entity performing s 
similar function. 
(7) This section applies retrospectively to any proceeclini 
under this chapter initiated after January 1,1992. 200 
31A-27-335.5. Health maintenance organizatioi 
claims. 
In the liquidation of a health maintenance organization 
claims for uncovered expenditures have priority over the thir< 
class of claims as provided for in Section 31A-27-335. All othe 
claims shall follow the priority of distribution outlined h 
Section 31A-27-335. 199 
31A-27-336. Liquidator's recommendations to th 
court. 
(1) The liquidator shall review all claims duly filed in th 
liquidation and shall make any further investigation as h 
considers necessary. He may compound, compromise, or in an 
other manner negotiate the amount for which claims will b 
recommended to the court, except where the liquidator i 
required by law to accept claims as settled by another persoi 
including a guaranty fund or association. Unresolved dispute 
shall be determined under Section 31A-27-332 As soon a 
practicable, the liquidator shall present to the court th 
reports of claims against the insurer with the liquidator 
recommendations. The liquidator shall notify claimants < 
these recommendations. The report shall include the nam 
and address of each claimant, the particulars of the claim, an 
the amount of the claim finally recommended, if any. If th 
insurer has issued annuities or life insurance policies, th 
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(b) (i) State government officer and employee members 
who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses from 
their agency for their service may receive per diem 
and expenses incurred in the performance of their 
official duties from the board at the rates established 
by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 
and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) State government officer and employee mem-
bers may decline to receive per diem and expenses for 
their service. 
(c) Legislators on the committee shall receive compen-




78A-2-601. Security surcharge — Application and ex-
emptions — Deposit in restricted account. 
(1) In addition to any fine, penalty, forfeiture, or other 
surcharge, a security surcharge of $33 shall be assessed in all 
courts of record on all criminal convictions and juvenile 
delinquency judgments. 
(2) The security surcharge may not be imposed upon: 
(a) nonmoving traffic violations; 
(b) community service; and 
(c) penalties assessed by the juvenile court as part of 
the nonjudicial adjustment of a case under Section 78A-
6-602. 
(3) The security surcharge shall be collected after the 
surcharge under Section 51-9-401, but before any fine, and 
deposited with the state treasurer. A fine tha t would otherwise 
have been charged may not be reduced due to the imposition of 
the security surcharge. 
(4) The state treasurer shall deposit the collected security 
surcharge in the restricted account, Court Security Account, 
as provided in Section 78A-2-602. 2009 
78A-2-602. Court Security Account establ ished — 
Funding — Uses. 
(1) There is created a restricted account in the General 
Fund known as the Court Security Account. 
(2) The state treasurer shall deposit in the Court Security 
Account: 
(a) collected monies from the surcharge established in 
Section 78A-2-601; 
(b) monies from the portion of filing fees established in 
Subsections 78A-2-301(l)(j)(iv) and (v); and 
(c) amounts designated by Subsection 78A-7-122 
(3)(b)(ii). 
(3) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall use the 
allocation to contract for court security at all district and 




78A-3-101. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice 
and associate chief justice — Selection and 
functions. 
78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
78A-3-103 Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro 
tempore, and practice of law. 
78A-3-104. Appellate court administrator. 
78A-3-105. Service of sheriff to court. 
78A-3-101. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justi 
and associate chief jus t ice — Select ion and 
functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five just ices. 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appoints 
initially to serve until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appointment. There-
after, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten 
years and commences on the first Monday in J anua ry follow, 
ing the date of election. A justice whose te rm expires mav 
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is 
appointed and qualified. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief 
justice from among the members of the court by a majority 
vote of all justices The term of the office of chief justice is four 
years. The chief justice may serve successive te rms. The chief 
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be 
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all 
justices of the Supreme Court. 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 
days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall 
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this 
section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to 
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of 
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by 
law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The 
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years. The 
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall be 
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme 
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice deter-
mines. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice. 
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate 
chief justice as consistent with law. 2008 
78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer 
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and 
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, 
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of 
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative 
proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of 
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division 
of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record 
holding a statute of the United States or this state 
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unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements 
of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its 
review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 2009 
78A-3-103. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro 
tempore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 2008 
78A-3-104. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court. 2008 
78A-3-105. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 2008 
CHAPTER 4 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78A-4-101. Creation — Seal. 
78A-4-102. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78A-4-104. Location of Court of Appeals. 
Section 
78A-4-105. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78A-4-106. Appellate Mediation Office — Protected 
records and information — Governmental 
immunity. 
78A-4-101. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
2008 
78A-4-102. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 2008 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
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le 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which 
appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court 
lie appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
til be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days 
3T the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from, 
wever, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory 
:ible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal 
uired by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
irt within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
er appealed from. 
b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions. 
b)(l) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the 
owing motions, the time for all parties to appeal from the 
gment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the 
tion: 
b)(l)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the 
ah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
b)(l)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of 
t, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be 
[uired if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of the Utah 
les of Civil Procedure; 
bXD(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under 
le 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
b)(l)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah 
les of Civil Procedure; or 
b)(l)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah 
les of Criminal Procedure. 
b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry 
judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of any 
tion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry 
;he order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice 
appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying 
[gment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any motion 
,ed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal or an 
tended notice of appeal within the prescribed time mea-
*ed from the entry of the order. 
c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of 
peal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, 
order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be 
ated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is 
kd by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal 
thin 14 days after the date on which the first notice of 
peal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by 
ragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule, whichever period last 
Dires. 
e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a 
)wing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the 
le for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later 
in 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by 
ragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. A motion filed before 
miration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the 
al court otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after 
Diration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other 
rties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial 
irt. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed 
le or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the 
>tion, whichever occurs later. 
f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in 
mmal cases. Upon a showing that a criminal defendant was 
prived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall reinstate 
J thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant 
iking such reinstatement shall file a written motion in the 
itencing court and serve the prosecuting entity. If the 
fendant is not represented and is indigent, the court shall 
point counsel. The prosecutor shall have 30 days after 
vice of the motion to file a written response. If the prose-
'Or opposes the motion, the trial court shall set a hearing at 
which the parties may present evidence. If the trial court finds 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has 
demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to appeal, it 
shall enter an order reinstating the time for appeal. The 
defendant's notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the 
trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the order, 
(g) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an 
inmate confined in an institution files a notice of appeal in 
either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is 
timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail 
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be 
shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting 
forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage 
has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the manner 
provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives 
the first notice of appeal. 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory or-
ders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an 
interlocutory order may be sought by any party by filing a 
petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order 
with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial 
court, with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A 
timely appeal from an order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that the appellate court determines 
is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate court, be 
considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission 
to appeal an interlocutory order. The appellate court may 
direct the appellant to file a petition that conforms to the 
requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented to 
the Supreme Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court an original and five copies of the petition, 
together with the fee required by statute. For a petition 
presented to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall file with 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals an original and four copies of 
the petition, together with the fee required by statute. The 
petitioner shall serve the petition on the opposing party and 
notice of the filing of the petition on the trial court. If an order 
is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the appellate 
court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the 
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the 
order, together with a copy of the petition, to the trial court 
where the petition and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of 
appeal. 
(c) Content of petition. 
(c)(1) The petition shall contain: 
(c)(1)(A) A concise statement of facts material to a consid-
eration of the issue presented and the order sought to be 
reviewed; 
(c)(1)(B) The issue presented expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail, and 
a demonstration that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court. Petitioner must state the applicable standard of appel-
late review and cite supporting authority; 
(c)(1)(C) A statement of the reasons why an immediate 
interlocutory appeal should be permitted, including a concise 
analysis of the statutes, rules or cases believed to be determi-
native of the issue stated; and 
(c)(1)(D) A statement of the reason why the appeal may 
materially advance the termination of the litigation. 
(c)(2) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme 
Court to the Court of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assign-
ment to the Court of Appeals" shall appear immediately under 
the title of the document, i.e. Petition for Permission to 
